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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, privacy management has become one of the most complex processes 
in the connected world. Fundamental technologies like GPS, cellular communications, 
and the Internet have become mandatory equipment in the modern vehicle. 
Subsequently, the vehicle became part of this connected world, wherein data are 
constantly sent and received. Accordingly, it became inevitable to introduce data 
security to vehicular communication. Hence, the development of location based and 
other connected services, introduced a new level of data complexity. In scenarios 
where GPS data are tied to certain entities or databases consisting of entire personal 
profiles, data cannot be treated separately anymore. Prior improvements regarding 
privacy protection achieved through anonymous pseudonyms have become negligible, 
due to GPS enabled traceability. This paper presents a new approach that turns privacy 
protection from a one-way street into a negotiation process. It allows the user to 
individually decide what data is provided and what is kept private. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis presents a privacy management concept that allows for privacy 
protection, while incorporating the latest developments in data complexity regarding 
vehicular applications. In general, location based services and services that involve 
location information, have significantly gained popularity among users and car 
manufacturers. The challenge at this point is, whenever general data, such as status 
information or location information, is combined with sensitive information like 
personal data, this new individual driving data cluster becomes sensitive as well. In 
other words, an increase in data complexity also results in an increase in security 
complexity (Fiaschetti et al., 2012). In order to protect these clusters, new data 
security classes need to be determined based upon the need for physical storage 
protection, access control, and required protection level. 
In previous work it has been shown that state of the art pseudonymous 
communication does not guarantee the required privacy, due to traceability 
(Wiedersheim et al., 2010). The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overall data 
analysis that allows for data classifications including correlating privacy classes. 
These classes shall be defining the basis for an automotive privacy model improving 
the flexibility and transparency of data protection based on the IBM-My Privacy 
Component Architecture, originally introduced for the Internet by Bohrer et al. in 
2001. A live vehicle-data extraction and distribution framework shall be utilized to 
identify the relevant data clusters and to evaluate and demonstrate the need for state of 
the art security mechanisms to be applied to different automotive use-cases. 
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Accordingly, it shall be shown how privacy protection mechanisms vary with the 
targeted use-case. Further, the general breakdown of responsibility regarding privacy 
protection among the involved developing parties shall be discussed. Additionally an 
extract of ongoing privacy debates shall illustrate how current laws, especially in the 
U.S., do not provide the necessary legal framework to protect personal data. 
In the past the focus of security solutions was related to in-vehicle security 
(Schweppe et al., 2012). Most of the data stayed either within the vehicle or were 
pulled from an external source (points of interests - POIs) that had no immediate 
relation with customers’ driving data. Accordingly, data monitoring was only 
necessary one way (intrusion detection). Now that data become steadily more 
individual and the back-end communication increases as vehicles become also more 
traceable, the protection of the driver’s privacy becomes more complex as well. 
Besides traceability, storage protection and access control have become even more 
crucial in order to protect each entity within the communication process. 
The result of this thesis shall deliver a classification model of the major data 
clusters generated from automotive applications and derived data security classes as 
described above. These classes shall serve as basis for the introduced privacy concept. 
In this chapter, the motivation is to briefly present the work in this thesis, 
regarding why pseudonyms do not offer full anonymity, the current privacy laws in 
the U.S. are not yet prepared for private data collections, and what general changes in 
privacy management are necessary in order to offer more transparency and flexibility 
to the customer. 
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MOTIVATION 
 
For a lot of inter-vehicle communication (IVC) system services, GPS data 
represent a major asset to various functions. Global position data is fundamental for 
location based services like recommendations for specific routes (e.g. scenic versus 
most direct routes), social events (hotspot identification), requesting the nearest 
business or service (e.g. ATM or restaurant), or turn-by-turn navigation to any 
address. 
It is obvious that IVC systems work with and thereby reveal very detailed 
location information patterns about the vehicle. A common and widely accepted 
security mechanism is the use of pseudonyms allowing to anonymously authenticating 
identities. However, the mapping of any kind of data with very precise GPS data 
allows generating a very detailed personal picture of the driver. In General, 
Wiedersheim et al. have demonstrated the possibility of reconstructing long traces of a 
majority of vehicles within the same area. According to their work it is more than 
questionable if location privacy is achievable in IVC systems against a powerful 
adversary. Even though actual identities are replaced by pseudonyms and those also 
change over time, once a target is identified based on its location every vehicle can be 
tracked. The attempt to change the location data density has not yielded the desired 
results due to standardization constraints (for more details see Chapter 8). 
Another recent approach regarding privacy protection was cutting out any kind 
personal data and thereby reducing the information exchange to simple quantity 
statements. One example is the private identification of location hotspots introduced 
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by Raghunathan et al. The protocol provides an anonymous voting mechanism that 
detects location hotspots, while not revealing anything about the voting participants. It 
defines optimal privacy protection. 
In contrast, services like online diagnosis, route recommendations or charging 
recommendations for electric vehicles require much more detailed data to be 
exchanged. In other words, in order to make use of these services at some point, data 
needs to be exposed. The popularity of mobile application has revealed that users are 
willing to provide certain data in order to make use of the various data services. As 
already mentioned in the introduction, one goal of this thesis is to provide a more 
flexible and also more transparent concept for privacy protection. The key to widely 
accepted services is transparency. As an example, the majority of smart phone users 
nowadays receive notifications when applications request access to certain kinds of 
data. The same transparent application profile management that integrates the user’s 
decision can easily be applied to the automotive environment. This thesis will discuss 
both mentioned data concepts regarding privacy protection and usability. 
The ubiquitous topic of privacy protection has led to major discussions among 
governmental parties, influential companies, and independent privacy authorities. 
Answering the question of how to protect private data appropriately has now been 
discussed for decades. It appears to be that the European Union has taken the leading 
role in these controversial debates, whereas the United States only started very 
recently to pay attention to privacy concerns. The latest privacy discussion among the 
authorities involves the integration of a communication device, also known as “black 
box” (as it exists in planes; Lowy, J., 2012). According to a governmental decision, 
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the device will be integrated into every new manufactured vehicle, for safety reasons. 
Privacy authorities claim that there exist no rules or policies that define limitations to 
the data collection enabled through this device. These conditions demand immediate 
action in order to protect privacy, this thesis will incorporate the following two 
privacy protection aspects. The first is to define specific privacy requirements based 
on the already mentioned hotspot detection protocol that provides optimal privacy 
protection and shall therefore be used a guideline. Second, the privacy protection 
directive given by the European Union is a worldwide-accepted directive and shall 
serve in this thesis as privacy protection policy standard. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND FINDINGS 
 
This thesis has implemented a live vehicle-data extraction and distribution 
framework. So far, data extraction has been available in many ways for in-vehicle data 
that is intended to be further processed on a back-end server. The current sensor data 
of a vehicle is mostly exchanged among the various electronic control units (ECUs) 
that communicate over the main in-vehicle network, the controller area network 
(CAN) bus (ISO 15765-2, 2004). Alternatively, greater amounts of data can be sent to 
a server that runs more complex data processing algorithms. These algorithms can 
either be used for internal purposes or to offer specific services like, for example route 
recommendations based on the driving style and vehicle model. The framework 
presented in this thesis provides a flexible subscription to all the available data (i.e. 
mostly CAN data) that can be used in various data services. Every service can decide 
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individually, through specific subscriptions, instead of simply tapping into a bus 
network that is flooded with all the available data. Additionally, the communication 
between the vehicle and the back-end is established over a wireless connection, which 
allows for even more flexibility. The communication build into the vehicle also 
incorporates GPS data, which is needed for the recommendation of charging-friendly, 
fun or scenic routes close to the customer. 
As already mentioned, whenever GPS data is involved, privacy becomes a major 
concern. One of the latest privacy protecting approaches focuses on the exchange of 
less data by cutting out any kind personal data. This concept provides clearly optimal 
privacy protection but significantly decreases the service opportunities. This thesis 
presents a privacy concept that adapts the needs the of detailed data services, while 
applying similar privacy requirements presented in the previous approach, but also 
allows for more flexibility. Besides state of the art security mechanisms are protecting 
the general communication, a transparent application profile management shall be 
integrated. This profile is inspired by the IBM My Privacy Component Architecture. It 
provides several primary components based on the IBM’s Enterprise Privacy 
Architecture (EPA) handling privacy concerns originally intended for the Internet. 
This thesis shows that this concept can easily be integrated into the automotive 
environment, with requirements derived from the “Golden Rules”. The Golden Rules 
are part of the German Federal Data Protection Act, the so called “Golden Rules.” 
These Golden Rules are also mounted into the British and most other European 
country’s federal laws. The act focuses on the protection against misuse of personal 
data in terms of data processing (BDGS, 1994, also see Chapter 2 and 6). The profile 
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management shall improve privacy protection, by allowing the vehicle client to 
decide, what data shall be available for subscription. 
Both the framework and the privacy concept have been evaluated. Test cases for 
the framework have been defined based on standard black-box and white-box tests, 
looking at inputs and outputs, and whether the internal data processing operates as 
required. The state of the art privacy mechanisms applied in the guiding hotspot 
identification concept and the newly defined live vehicle-data extraction and 
distribution concept have been validated through mathematical proof of concept. 
Additionally the privacy concepts discussed, have been validated against the privacy 
requirements stated by the Golden Rules. 
As a basis for the privacy profile management, this thesis gives an overview of 
the various automotive applications and assigns data security classes derived from the 
IBM concept and translated into the automotive context.  
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OUTLINE DESCRIPTION 
The structure of this thesis is divided into nine fundamental parts: 
 
Chapter two gives an overview of current data applications and available privacy 
policies and security mechanisms 
Chapter three introduces the use-case definition, and the live vehicle-data extraction 
and distribution framework 
Chapter four describes a conceptual integration of the created privacy concept 
Chapter five gives an overview of the framework implementation 
Chapter six provides the experimental setup to evaluate the introduced framework 
and the related privacy concept 
Chapter seven presents the evaluation results of experimental setups 
Chapter eight gives an overview on related work including common data application 
implementations, privacy concepts and current legal cases concerning privacy 
Chapter nine gives an overall conclusion summarizing the work and findings of this 
thesis 
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CHAPTER 2 – PRIVACY AND ITS MANAGEMENT FOR CONNECTED 
VEHICLES 
 
This section will introduce the most common vehicle-to-x and other connected 
user applications. In a second step, the available applications shall be summarized data 
categories. Eventually, state of the art privacy protection policies and mechanisms 
shall be presented. 
 
AUTOMOTIVE COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Automotive Telematics 
The fundamental technologies for automotive implementations were first aligned 
in the 1990s with GPS, cell phone technology and the Internet (Cordis, 2013). 
The most precise definition of telematics is, “a wireless communication system 
designed for the collection and dissemination of information that particularly refers to 
vehicle-based electronic systems; vehicle tracking and positioning; online navigation; 
and information systems and emergency assistance” (Tutorials point, 2013). 
The telematics system is implemented into the vehicle as the telematics 
communications unit (TCU) that communicates wireless with a central service center. 
The TCU functions as a central platform of the vehicle telematics system that 
incorporates all telematics-associated technologies. It provides location-specific 
information to a central service center, whereas the center helps to deliver telematics 
services to a vehicle via cellular phone. Further, the TCU is linked to the engine 
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control unit (ECU) allowing for enhanced services i.e. remote engine diagnostics and 
automatic airbag notification. A very common application that has been integrated into 
the vehicle for years is related to a system called “black-box” (as it exists in planes; 
Lowy, J., 2012). Before signals are transmitted as wireless signals they will be 
collected through this module, which is placed behind the dashboard. It integrates a 
phone, GPS receiver, digital signal processor and microphone for voice recognition. 
Additionally it incorporates the vehicle’s data bus to collect diagnostic information 
from the available sensors. On the other side, the so called back-end server functions 
like an Internet server, i.e. handling applications (analyzing diagnosis data) 
(Electronics-TCU, 2013). Other current and future telematics applications are listed 
below (Tab.1). 
 
Table 1: Telematics data application overview 
Application Description 
Navigation services (POIs) Provides extended navigation services 
Web radio Provides access to online radio 
Wi-Fi hotspots Provides Internet hotspot functionalities 
Traveling information, Provides specific information about the area 
Weather Provides weather forecasts and related information 
Nearest gas/charging station  Provides closest gas/charging station near your current 
location 
Emergency assistance Allows for emergency calls from the vehicle, providing 
position and other information 
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Recommendation engines Provides different recommendations according to 
different behaviors 
Online diagnosis  Provides immediate simple maintenance, and sets up 
needed appointments 
Pay-for-use Insurance Provides an insurance rate that is based on the driving 
behavior 
Black box systems  Provides crash monitoring (officially from Sep. 1st 
2014) 
Back2car Provides vehicle fleet management and extended 
connected services  
 
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) Communications 
Vehicle-to-infrastructure communications enable data transmissions from the 
roadside to the vehicle in order to alert drivers that e.g. it is not safe to enter a certain 
intersection. Data can be exchanged by using vehicles as data collectors, to 
anonymously transmit traffic and road condition data from all main roads of the 
transportation network. These data help to provide transportation agencies with the 
knowledge that is needed to implement dynamic plans allowing for reduced traffic 
congestions. One well-known application in vehicle-to-infrastructure communication 
is the electronic toll collection system. It is present in many countries and therefore 
somewhat advanced in terms of deployment. As already mentioned, other applications 
that shall enable the reduction of vehicular accidents, traffic congestions, 
transportation time, fuel consumption and environmental impact of road transport, 
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define the fundamental research areas (Holfelder et al., 2004; Jansons et al., 2012, 
National VII Coalition, 2013).An overview of current and future V2I applications is 
given below (Tab.2). 
Table 2: Vehicle-to-infrastructure data applications overview 
Application Description 
Wireless payment or toll systems Provides wireless payment systems at toll stations, 
(gas stations and parking garages) 
Real time traffic information Provides real time traffic within the network 
Traffic light assistant Provides congestions control through the 
distribution of traffic light timings 
 
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Communications 
For many years now, vehicle-to-vehicle communication has been addressed by 
automotive and non-automotive research organizations. The most common use cases 
include numerous infotainment applications i.e. ad-hoc networking for information 
exchange, chat applications or gaming, but also advanced active safety applications 
i.e. inter-vehicle hazard warning or spectrum intersection collision avoidance systems. 
Until today, not any of those applications have moved to production due to technical 
and non-technical i.e. business related issues (Holfelder et al., 2004). An overview of 
current and future V2V applications is given below (Tab.3). 
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Table 3: Vehicle-to-vehicle data applications overview 
Application Description 
Accident reporting Provides accident report distribution 
Warnings (entering intersections, 
departing highways, sudden halts, 
lane change) 
Provides context-based warnings 
Adaptive cruise control (ACC) Provides automatic vehicle speed adjustments 
 
Social Media Communication 
According to current development trends, social platforms like Facebook and 
other social applications like Twitter are planned to be integrated into the modern 
vehicle’s infotainment system (Tab.4). 
Table 4: Social data applications overview 
Application Description 
Facebook Provides access to friends activities 
Twitter Provides access to friends activities and news 
 
Automotive application data categories 
The table below (Tab.5) shows the prior introduced data applications grouped in 
three data categories as a basis for the later evaluation that shall result in the required 
data security classes. 
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Table 5: Application data categories 
Application 
type 
Identifiable data 
Time/location 
based data 
Broadcasted data, or 
independent data 
V2I Wireless payment 
or toll systems 
real time traffic 
information 
Traffic light assistant 
V2V  Accident 
reporting 
Warnings (entering 
intersections, departing 
highways, sudden halts, 
lane change) 
Adaptive cruise control 
(ACC) 
Telematics Online diagnosis Navigation 
services (POIs) 
Web radio 
Wi-Fi hotspots Traveling 
information, 
Weather 
Online news 
Pay-for-use 
Insurance 
Emergency 
assistance 
Nearest 
gas/charging 
station 
Black box systems 
(crash monitoring – 
Sep. 1st 2014) 
Back2car 
Social Media Facebook  newsfeeds, twitter 
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PRIVACY PROTECTION POLOCIES 
 
This section will introduce the term privacy protection and provide the 
background of common protection policies that are mostly addressed by the European 
and in some cases by the U.S. law. 
 
Privacy definitions 
The general definition of privacy describes “The state or condition of being free 
from being observed or disturbed by other people” (Oxford, 2013).In particular data 
privacy can be defined as “The relationship between collection and dissemination of 
data ...” (Ethics point, 2013). Further privacy concerns “…exist wherever personally 
identifiable information is collected and stored – in digital form or otherwise” (Ethics 
point, 2013). A trivial form of personally identifiable information in the automotive 
context can be vehicle identification numbers (VINs), or more complex, location 
information (GPS information) allowing for traceability and making IDs negligible 
(see Chapter 8). 
In the following section discusses the contrast between European and U.S. 
regarding privacy protection. 
 
U.S. vs. European governmental privacy policies 
 
A fundamental difference between the two legislations represents the treatment of 
sensitive personal data. In its basis the U.S. law does not provide one comprehensive 
statute conducting data protection or privacy issues but has a number of laws and 
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executive orders instead. It’s mainly the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Computer 
Matching and Privacy Act offering laws that solely deal with personal data held by the 
federal government but however have no authority over the collection and use of 
personal data held by non-government parties. Further, the Computer matching and 
Privacy Protection Act adds regulations controlling the usage of computer matching. 
The term matching in this context refers to computerized comparison of individual 
data that shall determine the eligibility for Federal benefit programs (e.g. recouping 
payments, delinquent debts).Additionally the Computer Security Act assures the 
security of personally identifiable data in federal computer systems. Supplementary, 
there have been laws created by the U.S. legislation that are in a wider context related 
to privacy and data protection. They cover aspects like prohibiting the use of 
personally identifiable data from the census, protecting against disclosure of personal 
data gathered by the National Centers for Health Service and Research, revising the 
confidentiality and dissemination practices, making tax return information confidential 
and eventually having criminal penalties for illegal disclosures. A second type of law 
creating in the U.S. can be described as a responsive approach. It is that laws are 
created in reaction to observed abuses. One response was a restriction for the federal 
government to access records held by other sources. Until the era of the Internet, 
misuse of personal data held by public or private entities was not conceived by 
policymakers as a threat to privacy or personal liberty (Stratford et al., 1998). 
In the starting process of adapting to the connected digital world, the European 
Union (EU) has had a predominant role regarding international decisions on information 
privacy. The dominance of the EU has been strengthened by the authority of EU Member 
Nations, as they coherently block data transfers from their country to third party nations 
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(EPCD, 1995).The term “third party countries” is also referring to such nations as the 
U.S., which according to the EU is missing “adequate” privacy protections (Hustinx, 
1999). The sectoral privacy law in the U.S. divides the responsibilities for public and 
private data categories. As a consequence, in case data cannot be assigned to any of the 
available categories, they might not be protected at all (Solove et al., 2011). 
Over the years the U.S. sector-by-sector approach stands still in contrast to the 
EU’s so called omnibus legislation, which treats personal data regardless whether they 
are private or public sector related. The global reaction prooves the EU as highly 
influential, whereas the U.S. appears to be an outlier regarding data protection. The 
EU Data Protection Directive established mutual rules for data privacy among its 
member states and set a three year deadline to adopt compliant legislation (Regan, 
1995). 
Eventually the U.S. law understood the importance of privacy protection and enacted 
data protection laws. Further the Commerce Department of the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) is now a full member of EU privacy conferences (Bamberger et al., 
2011). 
Due to the still existing EU supremacy regarding data protection legislation, the 
protection measures in this thesis shall be based on the European standards, briefly 
introduced in the next section. 
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Golden Rules 
The so called “Golden rules” (listed in Chapter 6) are mounted into the German, 
British and most other European countries federal laws (HM Government, 2008). The 
act focuses on the protection against misuse of personal data in terms of data 
processing. The definition can e.g. be found as an annex to section 9 in the German 
“Federal Data Protection Act”, which is related to technical and organizational 
measures and therefore fundamental policy for big companies like Volkswagen 
dealing with various amounts of data. 
Later on these rules shall be used as state of the art privacy policies in order to 
evaluate the presented privacy concepts. 
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GENERAL DATA AND IT-SECURITY MECHANISMS 
 
This section will introduce standard and to a greater extend later applied data and 
IT-security mechanisms. 
 
Certificates 
Digital Certificates 
Digital certificates supplement electronic messages with the purpose of providing 
authentication measures. The term authentication refers to the procedure that a 
receiver of a message is able to verify that the sender is the true sender. In order to 
send an encrypted message, an entity needs to apply for a digital certificate from a 
Certificate Authority (CA). The CA issues an encrypted digital certificate consisting 
of a public key and various identification data. For protocol reasons the CA’s own 
public key is made available to the public via e.g. the Internet (Fig.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CA 
H 
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Unsigned certificate: 
 User data 
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Signed certificate: 
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Hash of unsigned 
certificate 
CA’s 
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Signature 
Message digest 
(Code.google, 2013) Figure 1: Digital signing 
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Now the recipient of the encrypted message makes use of the CA's public key in 
terms of decoding the digital certificate tied to the message. This action verifies that 
the certificate has been issued by the CA and also allows the receiver to obtain the 
sender's public key and identification data included in the certificate (Fig.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on this new knowledge the receiver is now able to send an encrypted 
response. The most commonly applied standard for digital certificates is X.509. 
Version 1 was introduced in 1988 integrated into the International Telecommunication 
Unit (ITU) X.500 Directory Services standard. Since then, two more revisions of the 
standard have been published including additional fields supporting directory access 
control, extensions for additional data regarding the certificate holder and the 
certificate usage. The main parameters of a certificate are listed in the following 
(Tab.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed certificate: 
 Recipient can verify signature 
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If equal the signature is valid 
Figure 2: Digital verification (Code.google, 2013) 
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Table 6: Certificate parameters 
Name Content 
Serial Number Integer 
Signature Algorithm Identifier, Value: bit string 
Issuer Name 
Validity Not Before Time, Not After Time 
Subject Name 
Subject Public Key Info Algorithm Identifier, Value: bit string  
Version Integer {v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)} 
Time UTC Time, General Time 
Unique Identifier Bit string 
Standard Attributes Country 
Organization 
Locality 
Title 
Name 
Pseudonym 
 
In general, the term X.509 denotes the latest, Version 3, unless the version 
number is specified differently (RFC 4158; 5280, 2013). 
Certification Authority – CA infrastructure 
The management of certificates is one of aspects covered by the commonly 
applied WAVE standard (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment) in vehicle-to-x 
(RFC 5280, 2013) 
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(V2X) communications. The standard comprises information exchange among 
vehicles (private and public), confirmation with Certification Authorities (CA), which 
includes providing personal data in a wireless environment. Besides the CA the main 
parties involved are the car manufacturer (OEM) and the vehicle itself represented by 
the hardware security module (Fig.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The OEM generates a unique ID (usually the Vehicle Identification Number – 
VIN), a long term public-key pair linked to a long-term certificate. The certificate 
including the ID and other data shall then be validated by the CA. This process allows 
for an authenticated communication among the different entities. As a part of the in-
vehicle communication architecture, the hardware security module (HSM) generates 
short term key pairs and sends them to the Certification Authority. The CA then 
validates them and generates related pseudonyms, both linked to a short term 
 Hardware Security Module : HSM  
short-term-key-pair 
short-term-certificate 
Pseudonyms 
generate
s 
validates 
validates 
 Unique ID 
Long-term-key-pair 
Long-term-certificate 
 
validates validates 
generates 
Car Manufacturer 
Certification 
Authority 
Figure 3: Certification management 
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certificate. There are different responsibility level for a CA, that is general regional 
limitations but also country limitations. In order to prevent identification based on 
certificates linked to certain regions or countries a mechanism called cross-
certification has been implemented into the standard. In order to initiate the cross 
certification the vehicle with a certificate from region (A) would first have to 
authenticate itself to a CA responsible for region (B) by providing its existing long 
term certificate. Once a vehicle crosses the border to the new authority region, a new 
short term certificate, with a new set of associated pseudonyms and public key 
pairslinked to the new region, will be issued by the new CA. At the point, when the 
vehicle returns to its original region, the short-term certificate that was specifically 
generated for region B, will be revoked and the responsibility will handed back again 
to the original CA. Another important feature of certification revocation is used for 
authentication management. Vehicles or other communication participants like road 
side units (RSU) functioning as gateways within overall vehicular ad-hoc networks 
(VANETs) can be revoked in case of e.g. malicious behavior. The information about 
revoked participants is distributed in so called certification revocation lists (CRLs) that 
are broadcasted among the participants. 
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Cipher methodologies 
Symmetric encryption 
Symmetric cipher algorithms are based on so-called “secret-keys” shared between 
the communicating parties. The term “symmetric” refers to the fact that encryption 
and decryption are using the exact same key. The basic principle is illustrated in the 
graphic below (Fig.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) was invented by IBM and the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 1976, USA (see INV; FIPS, 1999). It belongs 
to the family of block ciphers and uses involution (a function is its own inverse) as 
main function and highly non-linear function as security mechanism. 
Complementarily it uses a key map providing keys for every round of involution. It 
takes two 32bit input blocks (L) and (R) as clear text and outputs 64 bit of cryptogram 
              The key map provides a different key (K) of 48bit length derived from 
a 64bit key for up to 16 rounds. The round structure was invented by the IMB engineer 
Horst Feistel, who migrated from Germany to the US in 1934. The already mentioned 
involution function is a self-inverting function (F) that applied twice compensates 
1. Step: 
Sender selects a 
key and encrypts. 
plaintext 
ciphertext 
plaintext 
encryption decryption 
2. Step: 
Sender gives separately key 
and ciphertext to receiver. 
3. Step: 
Receiver uses key to 
decrypt the ciphertext 
Figure 4: Symmetric cipher algorithm (MxRelease, 2013) 
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itself. After all, nobody was able to break the involution mechanism since 1976 
(Menezes, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In case there is more than one key involved a transposition phase will be added 
for (N) additional key blocks (Fig.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An advancement of DES is the so called Triple DES (TDEA). It comprises three 
times cascaded DES, with three keys of each 56 bit length. TDEA offers a 
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Figure 5: Data Encryption Standard (DES) with one key (K) encryption 
Figure 6: Data Encryption Standard (DES) with (N) key (K) encryption 
 26 
 
comparatively simple method that increases the key size of DES to protect against 
such attacks. It comprises three times cascaded DES, with three keys of each 56 bit 
length.  Accordingly, there are different keying options, with either all three keys 
being independent, only two keys independent, or all keys the same. The more keys 
are independent the longer becomes the total key length (FIPS, 2012).  The longer the 
key length the stronger in fact becomes the cipher but also the computational 
complexity. 
Asymmetric encryption 
Asymmetric cipher algorithms are based on so-called “public-key” protocols. The 
term “asymmetric” is related to the fact that the encryption and decryption keys 
represent each other’s inverse. Subsequently, when both keys come together they 
revoke the cipher and the secured message will appear. The public key of the receiver 
shall be used for encryption, whereas the sender’s secret key is used as the signature. 
This guarantees that only the intended receiver can open and decrypt the message and 
allows the sender to authenticate it. The basic principle is illustrated in the graphic 
below (Fig.7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Step: Receiver gives 
public key to sender. 
2. Step: Sender uses public key to 
encrypt the plaintext. 
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decryption 
Figure 7: Asymmetric cipher algorithm (Data-Processing, 2013) 
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Digital Signatures 
An additional application of public cipher algorithms besides encryption is to 
provide digital signatures as proof of authenticity of a digital message or document 
(Rivest et al., 1983). A common signature scheme is the RSA Digital Signature 
scheme, which shall be presented in the following reflecting the work of Rivest et al. 
In order to have two parties communicating in a secure and authenticated manner, 
both need a public key and a public modulo   . The latter shall be based on two secret 
preferably high primes generating a multiplicative inverse Groupℤn
*
.The highest order 
and the number of invertible elements in a multiplicative group can be determined 
with the Euler Function φ(n), with φ(φ(n)) as the number of units with the highest 
order (Delfs et al., 2007). Since RSA operates with exponents there are two related 
modulo defined in the scheme. According to Euler’s Totient Theorem, that is      
       , such that     and     being relatively prime it holds that      is defined as 
modulo of the exponent, with          for     being prime (Weisstein, 2013). 
The parameter setup for the scheme is defined as follows (Rivest et al., 1983). 
Public parameters 
1. Public Keys 
a. For user A :    
b. For User B:    
2. Public Modulo  
a. For user A:          , defining the modulo for user A 
b. For user B:          , defining the modulo for user B 
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Private parameters 
1. Private Key user A and B:       
2. Secret large prime pairs of user A and B:         and         
 
The protocol comprises the following steps: 
1. Step: User A generates cryptogram    , with    in modulo   , with 
            
2. Step: User A generates signature    , with proving content     and    in 
modulo   , with 
            
3. Step: User A sends       to user B 
4. Step: User B decrypts cryptogram     and verifies     
a.                    
b.                   
  
c.     , proves authenticity of the sender 
Blind Signature Schemes 
The first introduction of blind signature schemes was published by Chaum, 
allowing messages signed by a third party without exposing any information about the 
message itself (Chaum, 1983, 1985). Blind signatures have various usability including 
anonymous access control, and digital cash. 
In his work he extended the implementation of RSA signatures (Rivest et al., 
1983) as follows. A client has a message m that needs to be signed by another party 
like e.g. a communication server, and the client does not want the server to know 
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anything about (m). Let (e, n) be the server’s public key and (d, n) the private key, 
with n being the applied arithmetic modulo. The client generates a random unit (r) (an 
element that is invertible under multiplication is called unit; Giambruno, 2008). 
Another property of (r) is that it satisfies            stating that (r) is relatively 
prime to (n). In other words (r) and (n) have no common factor raise the level of 
protection (Johnston et al., 2009). The modular multiplicative inverse of (e) or (r) can 
be determined based on the Extended Euclidean algorithm (Koshy, 2007). An example 
design using the RSA Blind Signature shall give a more detailed insight on how the 
defined mechanism is designed (Goldwasser et al., 2008). 
 
1. Step: Server defines public directory and sends it to the client 
a. Server defines public directory (e, n), with highly prime (e) as 
public key and public modulo     , with p and q highly prime 
and             
b. Sends public directory to client 
2. Step: Client computes blinded message and sends it to the server 
a. Client defines message (m) and random unit (r) 
b. Client Computes blinded message                
c. Sends (BM) to the server 
 The server cannot derive any useful information from (BM) 
3. Step: Server signs blinded message and sends it back to the client 
a. Signs the blinded message by computing 
               and sends it back to the client 
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4. Step: Client extracts signed message 
a. Client Computes                          , with 
                         , that is 
by the server signed message (m) with private key (d) 
b. Obtains the true blind signature (BS) of (m) 
The security of this signature scheme is implicit with the standard security 
argument that factoring and root extraction remains computationally infeasible 
(Gregg, J. A. et al., 2003). In general the signature scheme is unconditionally “blind” 
since (r) is chosen randomly and therefore does not allow the signer (here: the server) 
to learn about the message even if just mentioned computational infeasible problems 
can be solved. 
Commitment Schemes 
A commitment scheme describes a secret agreement or exchange of knowledge 
about certain information or message (Pedersen, 1991). In this thesis, the common 
Chaum-Pedersen commitment scheme will be applied and described in following. The 
message commitment scheme comprises two steps, the commitment and the opening 
MC = (Commit, Open). The commitment executes (c,sk) ← Commit(m,r), whereas the 
input message (m) and randomness (r) generate a commitment (c) to message (m) and 
secret key that is necessary to open the commitment. In the subsequent opening step 
the client executes (m,r) ← Open(c,sk), whereas the inputs here commitment (c) and 
secret key (sk) generate the output message m and randomness (r) applied in the 
commitment. 
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Properties of a secure bit commitment scheme: 
1. hiding: no knowledge about the message m is exposed 
2. binding: committing to c and generating an opening (m’, r’) with m’≠ m is 
infeasible ((c) binds the client to message (m)) 
In other words, the commitment is hiding based on the fact that    is distributed 
uniformly over Group   and therefore hides    within the commitment       . 
The binding property is infeasible to break based on the assumption that the discrete 
logarithm over   for a polynomial-time adversary is infeasible (Harn, L., 1994). 
An example design using the Chaum-Pedersen Commitment shall give a more 
detailed insight on how the defined mechanism is designed (Chaum et al., 1992). 
System setup: The receiver chooses: 
1. Group   of prime order p (so the discrete logarithm is hard to solve) 
2. Generator g of order-q subgroup of ℤP
*
 
3. Secret (a) 
4. Scheme Parameter           
5. Commitment scheme               
The sender chooses a particular message m ∈ ℤP and a random factor (r). 
1. Step: (c,sk) ← Commit(m,r) 
a. Server defines public directory p, g,          , 
with (a) private 
b. Sends public directory to client 
c. Client computes commitment c’ 
d. Client sends (c’, m, r) to server 
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2. Step: (m,r) ← Open(c,sk) 
a. Server computes (c), with (h, g, m, r) 
b. Server verifies commitment with computed (c) and received (c’), 
that is              
Zero Knowledge Proofs 
So called Zero-Knowledge-Proofs-of-Knowledge (ZKPoK) were invented by 
Goldwasser, Micali and Racko in 1982 (Goldreich, 2002). The general approach of 
mathematical proofs is to provide all the necessary facts in order to prove that a 
statement is true. In contrast a ZKPoK does not reveal any facts. Zero-Knowledge 
Proofs (ZKPs) allow having another party prove that a statement is true. The other 
party will be completely convinced about the truth of the statement, but will not learn 
anything about it. In other words, the other party will gain zero knowledge (Barak, 
2010). In this thesis, the Schnorr’s ZKP will be applied suggesting a proof of 
knowledge for the discrete logarithm, which will be explained in the following. 
Recollecting the setup from the previous parameters:  
Commitment parameters 
o Multiplicative group: ℤ , with   being prime 
o Message:  
o Commitment:   
o Randomness:   
o Secret key:   
o Generator:   
o Public parameter:      
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Proof parameters: 
o Additional randomness:           
 
Identification protocol: 
1. Step: Client computes          
a.       
    
b.       
           
c. Sends          to server 
2. Step: Server chooses random   
a. With   from ℤ    
b. Sends   to client 
3. Step: Client computes          
a.                      with          
b.                       
c. Sends          to server 
4. Step: Server verifies  
a.           
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CHAPTER 3 – VEHICLE DATA EXTRACTION AND DISTRIBUTION 
FRAMEWORK 
 
INTRODUCING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
With respect to recent developments within the automotive industry, reliable 
range estimation for electric vehicles (EVs) has become a crucial feature when it 
comes to investing in this new technology. Online diagnosis would be based on the 
transfer of diagnostic data from the vehicle to the backend for immediate 
interpretation. 
A more general approach is to combine various kinds of vehicle-data with GPS 
tags enabling completely new algorithmic opportunities. In this context, one goal of 
this architecture is to make the required vehicle-data (e.g., energy consumptions, 
current speed, and diagnosis data) available on backend for further processing. 
Future developments could go into customized route recommendations with 
topics like navigated guidance in terms of route recommendations titled with e.g. 
“Scenic” vs. “Sport” routes. This approach will depend on existing driving style data 
combined with car model information and other useful criteria like the already 
mentioned GPS data. 
The attempt of this first application concept is to construct an architecture that is 
able to collect live-data from on-board units inside the vehicle and send them back to 
the backend for further processing. Overall the approach of this service follows the 
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characteristics of connected applications that are making local data globally 
accessible. Further details on the data processing will be discussed in the section. 
DATA PROCESSING 
 
The data processing concept essentially comprises of four different phases, data 
extraction, data collection, data publishing and subscription (Fig.8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data extraction determines the relevant BUS data from inside the vehicle. 
This includes the generation of update packages and sending them to the backend. The 
data collection represents the extraction and processing of all the data belonging to one 
update package in order to make them available for an another independent 
application. 
In the final step, the aforementioned independent application will be able to 
access the forwarded vehicle data by subscribing to context relevant data. The data 
packages consist of status information and currently measured values. 
Figure 8: Data processing 
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In general there are two approaches when it comes to connected applications 
which are related to either increasing or decreasing the data complexity. In the 
following sections both approaches will be specified with concrete use-cases. 
 
POSSIBLE CONCEPT ALTERATIONS 
 
This first approach represents an increased complexity level. It can result in 
applying complex data mining algorithms allowing for substantial long term 
statements. Regarding the attempt of achieving a more accurate and reliable range 
estimation it has been shown that an increase in data amounts can bring significant 
improvements (Ferreira, J.C. et al.). On the downside, data mining leads to various 
privacy issues and most attempts so far have used obscurity as a security mechanism. 
This reduces the probability of identifying a particular individual but still doesn’t 
protect it appropriately (Cynthia Dworket al., 2010; Clifton, C., 2007). 
Two alterations of the main concepts (profile generation and diagnosis 
statements) follow Each will be explained in their functionalities and privacy 
requirements. 
One potential concept alteration could be the generation of driver profiles as an 
example for an increased data complexity. As already discussed, collecting data from 
the vehicle combined with certain logic and/or GPS data allows for various amounts of 
services, often referred to as connected services. For example, driving style matched 
with the car model can allow for route recommendations provided to the customer 
(Fig.9). Alternatively, it can help car manufacturers to improve their marketing 
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strategies by creating new vehicle configuration packages specifically for the 
discovered customer requirements. Considering electric vehicles, energy consumption 
over time enables analysis potential of the vehicle’s charging behavior based on the 
driven routes. This way the customers can adjust their driving behavior to optimize 
their charging strategy. All these various statements shall be then integrated in the 
customer’s personal profile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Another alteration can be to provide complex diagnosis statements to clients. 
They shall either provide immediate online maintenance (software updates, timing 
optimizations). In case of more complex diagnosis results, an automated appointment 
shall be made, based on information like vehicle type, driven miles, the actual 
diagnosis statement.  
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Figure 9: Protocol data processing concept 
Figure 10: Protocol architecture 
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One can tell from the graphic above (Fig.10) that although the concepts have 
different applications, the overall communication architecture is quite similar. 
Accordingly, the next section will present a privacy management approach that shall 
be representative for the main and its related concepts. 
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CHAPTER 4 – PRIVACY PROTECTION INTEGRATION 
 
HOW PRIVACY PROTECTION MECHANISMS VARY WITH THE 
APPLICATION 
 
As a descriptive entry, it is helpful to briefly recollect the biggest challenges with 
connected applications these days. Data collections have become goldmines for a lot 
of different business models, e.g. customer profiles, long-term or historic data used by 
so called data mining companies for further analysis. Positive results for the end 
customer shall be more personalized services. The down-side of this well-intended 
approach, besides money, is that the traded good is personal and sometimes very 
private information (Fischermannet al., 2013; Facebook RepPortal, 2012, IMFSurvey 
Magazine, 2012). 
One of the biggest wins from the connected world is the opportunity of nearly 
unlimited exchange of information (IMFSurvey Magazine, 2012) which in turn leads 
to the attempt of this use-case: achieving privacy protection while still being 
connected. In other words, the goal is to offer similar or even the same benefits to the 
customer but without exposing any sensitive, private or personal information. 
In the process of finding solutions protecting personal data while staying 
connected this use-case and its presented alterations will show-case what data privacy 
requirements are necessary and where protection constraints begin. It has been shown 
that increasing data protection is not sufficient through merely making storage more 
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secure or enhancing access controls in order to solve all privacy concerns, due to the 
human factor (NYMITY, 2012). 
The main goal with the presented framework is to make existing local data 
globally available. In the next step privacy concerns shall be addressed through the 
definition of privacy requirements. 
 
PRIVACY PROTECTION CONCEPT FOR THE PRESETNED FRAMEWORK 
 
The privacy concept discussed in this section shall be designed from the customer 
or client perspective. Since every service is based up on data that can be related to a 
private individual, it is important to protect it. 
 
In the following, the necessary privacy requirements and its related mechanisms 
will be discussed for the “Live vehicle data extraction and distribution” concept. 
Privacy requirements from the client perspective: 
1. The client needs to give permission to share the data that is being 
processed by the available services 
2. The raw data linked to the ID and location data must be protected 
3. The processed plain text must not be accessible for unauthorized 
personnel 
4. Optional. Additional trust bound between client and automotive company 
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Accordingly to the concept’s requirements respective privacy protection 
mechanisms shall be explained and illustrated in example designs. 
Requirement one can be satisfied with the following mechanism. This mechanism 
is fundamental for every system that claims to protect privacy. The setup of a privacy 
profile based on personal preferences and general policies given by the law should 
allow the client to manage what data are made available to the various service 
applications and which is kept private. IBM published on the fourth International 
Conference on Electronic Commerce Research (Bohrer, 2001) a technical approach 
for personal information and distribution. The communication matches is based on 
XML standards which matches perfectly with the automotive environment standards. 
Most telematics applications deal with the collection of information (in-vehicle 
measurements and status signals) that are usually streamed to the backend server in 
XML format (ASA, 2008; Telematics Update, 2013). Additionally, those data are 
mapped with very precise GPS data generating a very detailed personal picture of the 
driver. The necessity of these applications is often claimed by insurance companies 
since they can profit from the generated knowledge (ASA, 2008; Cognizant, 2012). It 
is obvious that there are cases (e.g. emergency cases) where GPS data can be very 
helpful in sending out assistance to a location provided by the individual in need. On 
the contrary, in a lot of other cases these GPS links may be utilized inappropriately by 
tracking individuals (ASA, 2008). 
The IBM Privacy Services (IPS) system therefore provides several primary 
components based on IBM’s Enterprise Privacy Architecture (EPA), handling privacy 
concerns for automotive telematics applications. The system includes automatic and 
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manual authorization for release of private data, matching the individual’s and general 
law related privacy policies with those of data-requesters/application (see Chapter 8 
for details). 
The following negotiation example is based on a dealer profile following the 
concept given by Bohrer et al. but translated into the automotive context. 
 
1. A customer sets up an online appointment with a dealer for new car. He adds 
the note that he also wants to sell his old car. 
2. The dealer receives the appointment request and asks in return for the name, 
address, salary and assets along with the privacy policy that the data will be 
used to approve credit. Additionally data about the old car will be requested 
like i.e. car make, mileage and year along with the privacy policy that these 
data will be used to determine the value of the old car. 
3. The profile denies the first part of the request and offers to send an alias profile 
including salary and an asset range. On the other hand the request about the 
vehicle data will be accepted.  
4. The dealer will accept the data but indicates that subsequently a final credit 
approval is not possible but only an analysis for a possible credit. 
5. The customer sends the data for the credit analysis only as well as the vehicle 
data to determine the value of the old car. 
 
Once the client has defined certain policies which shall be accompanied by 
common privacy laws, only authentic data requests that fulfill these policies shall be 
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permitted to the server (service provider).The authentication of the service request is 
based on two aspects, whether the requester is listed within the individual’s privacy 
profile and whether the requester has the permission to view the data like e.g. sensor 
data. As another privacy protection mechanism, the possibility of “data mashup”, 
autonomous data collection and integration through communicating applications must 
be prohibited (Soylu et al., 2012). Another more general goal of this approach is to 
build up trust between the client and the service application. Transparency in this 
context shall be utilized to establish this fundamental trust helping the client to 
understand what data are requested and what the purpose of this request is. 
Essential for this approach is a classification of data in order to define handling 
rules respectively. Hence, a data classification shall be the result of this thesis 
evaluation. 
Requirement two can be satisfied with the following mechanism. It needs to 
guarantee that all data linking to personal information, like IDs or location information 
will be protected. This kind of data, according to the main concept and its alterations, 
can be determined as the live data that is extracted from the vehicle’s internal 
communication. In order to protect it, a secure communication path between the 
vehicle, the server and a secure storage needs to be established. Protecting the 
communication path shall prevent public attacks and the secure storage shall reduce 
the human factor by limiting the accessibility inside the company’s backend. 
The protection of the communication path can be achieved with either symmetric 
or asymmetric ciphers. In order to maintain the performance of the system, the 
symmetric approach shall be preferred at this point. A well-known cipher algorithm is 
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the Data Encryption Standard (DES, see Chapter 2). The initial DES cipher's key 
length of 56 bits was sufficient was sufficient in most cases, but due to increasing 
computational power, brute-force attacks had become feasible. Triple DES (TDEA) 
offers a comparatively simple method that increases the key size of DES to protect 
against such attacks. Since TDEA is mostly based on the DES algorithm, in the 
following an overview of the DES block cipher protocol shall be provided. 
Upfront server and client need agree on a secret function (f) and secret keys (Ki). 
According to the protocol (L) and (R) and comprise a data block of 64 bit in total split 
up in 32 bit each. In the following a simplified example design will be presented 
showing the functionality of the algorithm. 
1. Step: Agreement 
a. Server and client agree on: 
      
 
, with f extracting the     LSB of the actual result, 
               with     representing an XOR operation, 
and          
2. Step: Client encrypts data block:              and sends it to the server 
a. Client assigns data blocks, 
with                              
b. Round 1: Computes              , 
with                            
extracting 4 LSBs →             
                               
c. Transposition:                , 
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and                  
d. Round 2: Computes       
          
                                
extracting 4 LSBs →             
                                
e. Transposition:                 , 
and                  
f. Sends cryptogram                 to server 
Once the server receives the cryptogram it can be stored in the database and 
linked to e.g. a unique session ID for internal traceability but associated with a flexible 
expiration date. After the session expires the ID as well as the data shall be deleted. In 
order to accomplish the following steps, it is important that the processing of the 
decrypted data follows the policies determined by the Golden Rules (see Chapter 2 
and 6). 
3. Step: Server decrypts data block 
a. Transposition:                
and                   
b. Server assigns data blocks, 
with                             
c. Round 1: Computes             , 
with                                           
extracting 4 LSBs →              
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d. Transposition:                 
and                 
e. Round 2: Computes                
                            
extracting 4 LSBs →             
                                 
f. Receives data block              
What this means for the prior defined architecture is a security extension for parts 
of the components (Fig.11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data are now communicated and stored encrypted according to the agreed secret 
key algorithm (secret key (SK), encrypted data ESK(D)). Only requested processing 
data will be decrypted DSK(D) and made available as plain text. The secret key shall be 
only known by the automotive company and the protected onboard unit of the vehicle. 
Every vehicle’s onboard unit is now equipped with a personal privacy profile such that 
only permitted data leaves the individual’s vehicle. One part of the in Chapter 2 
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Figure 11: Privacy enhanced framework 
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mentioned Golden Rules dealing with data protection is covered by the introduced 
mechanisms. It is assumed that the respective car manufacturer (OEM – Original 
Equipment Owner) has an established firewall system and secured data storage and 
therefore will be not part of this concept. 
The plain text processing section of this concept (Fig.11) asks for access control 
policies mainly addressed by the Golden Rules and therefore already common 
knowledge in every automotive company’s IT infrastructure. The assessment of these 
policies will be covered within evaluation later on in this thesis. 
The optional trust bound between client and automotive company will only be 
mentioned but not integrated into the concept since the required mechanisms are not 
immediate privacy protecting mechanisms. In some cases trust mechanisms are even 
counterintuitive. They often expose additional personal data in order to identify the 
communicating parties or simply increase the overhead while the added value is 
questionable. A trust enhancing mechanism from the OEM perspective can be Digital 
Signatures that besides the actual encrypted message sends a signed piece of 
information or the actual message (the already encrypted message) that shall validate 
the party’s identity. A signature is defined as the public of public key protocol like e.g. 
RSA (see Chapter 2). This will increase the overhead but in a manageable way, since 
the computational power is needed to verify a signature, which is fairly simple to do 
with the computational power on the backend side. 
In order to enhance the trust between both parties, the usage of certificates 
(Chapter 2) allows authenticating the identity in both ways but also brings more 
computational overhead on both sides. It is important to mention though that in order 
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to keep privacy protected, only make use of pseudonymous public key certificates as 
they do not contain any identifiable information. Consequently they cannot be used to 
link to a specific client or to another pseudonymous certificate. Since trust 
enhancements are necessary, but not immediate privacy protection mechanisms rather 
than security mechanisms, they were not considered as a part of the concept. 
Now that data are available as clear text, defined processing algorithms shall 
transform the extracted vehicle data into applicable statements that in turn shall be 
made available for the provided connected services. These services as a final step shall 
provide valuable recommendations or suggestions to the client. 
In the following, two possible approaches for a communication initiation and 
profile setups are described. The communication itself shall be based on unique 
expiring session ID and can be distinguished as active and passive from the client 
perspective. 
 
Active communication initiation: 
1. Client onboard unit sends service request 
2. Onboard unit checks with privacy profile for permission 
3. Onboard unit sends permitted data to server 
4. Server computes valuable statements 
5. Service extracts statements and forms results 
6. Service sends results back to client as recommendation or suggestion 
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Passive communication initiation: 
1. Client onboard unit detects anomaly in diagnosis data 
2. Onboard unit checks with privacy profile for permission 
3. Based on profile settings 
a. Onboard unit sends diagnosis data to server 
b. Onboard unit informs client with in-car signal about necessary 
service 
4. In case of a) server interprets diagnosis data extended services offers back 
to the client (e.g. service appointment data according to the diagnosis or 
applies immediate software correction if possible) 
The profile setups below (Tab. 7) illustrate how the client can decide, what data 
shall be made available to a specific service for subscription. As an example, a service 
like a travel guide shall be made available based on several levels of exposed personal 
related data. The chosen data in this example are destination location, current 
location and driving style. Driving style hereby can represent slow/fast drivers, driving 
with adaptive cruise control (ACC), etc. 
Table 7: Profile variations for a travel guide service 
Profile 1 Service List 1 
Allow Deny  
subscription 
to chosen 
destination 
locations 
  Destination information 
o Weather 
o Current events 
o Extended sight information 
 subscription 
to current 
location 
 subscription 
to driving 
style 
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Profile 2 Service List 2 
Allow Deny  
subscription 
to chosen 
destination 
locations 
  Destination information 
o Weather 
o Current events 
o Extended sight information 
 General route recommendation 
o Scenic routes 
o Charging/refuel 
recommendations 
 
subscription 
to current 
location 
 
 subscription 
to driving 
style 
Profile 3 Service List 2 
Allow Deny  
subscription 
to chosen 
destination 
locations 
  Destination information 
o Weather 
o Current events 
o Extended sight information 
 General route recommendation 
o Scenic routes 
o Charging/refuel 
recommendations 
 Customized routes 
o Relaxed routes 
o Sport, curvy routes 
subscription 
to current 
location 
 
subscription 
to driving 
style 
 
 
There are two important aspects to be noted at this point. On the one hand, the 
various profile setups shall demonstrate flexibility regarding the exposed data, based 
on the client’s decision. On the other hand, it shows the subsequent service limitations 
according to the client’s decisions. 
 
In the following the hotspot identification protocol as an already existing concept 
will be explained with its functionalities and privacy requirements (Raghunathan et al., 
2012). 
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PRIVACY PROTECTION CONCEPT FOR THE HOTSPOT IDENTIFACION 
PROTOCOL 
 
Protocol overview 
One approach for decreasing the data complexity is to reduce the amount of 
combined statements for simple interpretations. A more extreme approach regarding 
decreasing the amount of complexity can be found by looking at voting protocols. 
These protocols are dealing with rather trivial but effective statements by sharing 
quantity statements which as a consequence have no need for exchanging personal 
data. Having clients exchanging information through a distribution server makes it 
possible to filter location information so that individual identities are kept privately 
(Raghunathan et al., 2012). 
The fundamental idea of this approach is based on a distribution server relaying 
between the clients. This way, identifying information (like e.g., location information 
or identities) can be filtered so that each individual’s privacy is protected. Statements 
based on quantities derived from location based occurrences, like a lot of people in 
one spot, a lot of pictures taken in one spot, a lot of cars of one model or make in the 
same area can allow for hotspot identification. A lot of people in one spot can identify 
big events, a lot of pictures in one spot can identify points of interests (POIs) and a lot 
of cars of the same model or make can be an indicator for an optimal workshop or 
dealer position.  
The architecture is divided into two communication protocols. The first is 
designed as a registration protocol based on an authenticated channel (Fig.12). 
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Each client or automotive customer registers with an ongoing serial number to 
expand the uniqueness entropy, branded with a time-stamp for validation purposes and 
a corresponding ID and password. The reason for the registration phase is to equip 
each client with a voting token that will allow for participation in several votes per 
defined time period. 
As already mentioned, the second is designed as voting protocol based on an 
anonymous channel (Fig.13). 
 
 
 
 
 
After every voting period the client would have to register again to renew the 
voting permit. The re-vote feature is to guarantee up-to-date votes. A client’s vote in 
this protocol provides a location statement including a position and auxiliary data like 
further comments. 
 
SERVER CLIENTS 
AUTHENTICATED CHANNEL 
Registration Protocol 
(serial, ID, password) 
Voting Tokens 
(token) 
SERVER CLIENTS 
ANONYMOUS CHANNEL 
(voting permit, location) 
(voting permit, location) 
Figure 12: Hotspot identification registration protocol 
Figure 13: Hotspot identification voting protocol 
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The server, on the other hand, validates each vote and then only learns the 
location, not who is at that particular location. In the next step the server defines so- 
called rounded hotspots, hotspot areas, wherein each vote increments a vote count 
whose final tally will be published to all clients in the end. The total count is a 
quantity statement and tells each client about current hotspots. 
The defined privacy requirements and its related mechanisms that shall protect 
each client’s privacy will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Identified privacy protecting mechanisms in the protocol 
The focus of privacy requirements shall be based again on the customer or client 
perspective. 
Privacy requirements from the client perspective: 
1. Password and ID must be protected 
2. Client ID must not be linked to submitted vote 
3. Signatures must not link to the client’s ID 
4. The precise location must not be revealed to the server 
 
Accordingly the concept’s requirements respective privacy protection 
mechanisms shall be explained and illustrated in example designs. 
Requirement one can be satisfied with the following mechanism. It needs to allow 
for a secret agreement and exchange of knowledge about the client’s ID and password 
in order to guarantee authenticity (Pedersen, 1991). Common mechanisms to hide an 
agreement or commitment are so-called commitment schemes (see Chapter 2). In the 
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following an example design will be presented showing the functionality of the 
scheme. 
The sender is this scenario will be represented by client and the receiver by the 
server. The client chooses a particular message m ∈ ℤP and a random r, with m 
representing the bit code of the defined password and ID password and ID. For 
computational ease a decimal setup in ℤ37 will be used. 
 
1. Step:        ← Commit          
a. Server defines public directory                
and               
b. Sends public directory to client 
c. Client computes commitment 
                                  
d. Client sends                 to server 
2. Step:       ← Open              
a. Server computes (c), 
with                  
b. Server verifies commitment with computed c and received c, that 
is                                       
Now server and client have agreed to hidden message (m) with a binding 
commitment (c). As a consequence, only the client with the correct ID and password 
will be eligible to vote. The client is now responsible to protect both from the public in 
order to avoid misuse like manipulating entire voting phases. 
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Requirement two can be satisfied with the following mechanism. So-called Zero-
Knowledge-Proofs-of-Knowledge (ZKPoK) allows having a third party prove that a 
statement is true. This other party will be completely convinced about the truth of the 
statement, but will not learn anything about it. In other words, the third party will gain 
zero knowledge (Barak, 2010).In this thesis the Schnorr’s ZKP will be applied 
suggesting a proof of knowledge for the discrete logarithm, which will be explained in 
the following with a number example. 
This mechanism shall be used during the voting phase preventing the server from 
being able to link a vote to a registered client. This shall be achieved by having the 
client proving to the server that he knows his ID and password without revealing it. 
 
Recollecting the setup from the previous parameters: 
 Commitment parameters 
o Multiplicative group: ℤ , with      being prime 
o Message:    
o Commitment:          
o Randomness:     
o Secret key:     
o Generator:     
o Public parameter:         
 Proof parameters: randomness:                   
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Identification protocol: 
1. Step: Client computes          
a.       
        
b.       
                      
c. Sends          to server 
2. Step: Server chooses random   
a. With   from ℤ    
b. Sends   to client 
3. Step: Client computes          
a.                     
                                
b.                      
                                
c. Sends          to server 
4. Step: Server verifies  
a.           
           
           
                
                          
                      
       
 
 
Now Server has proof of the fact that the voting client has knowledge about his 
ID and password and therefore is a registered participant. At the same time the server 
did not learn anything about the ID and password so there is no chance that he can link 
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the collected hotspot vote to a specific client. In other words location privacy is 
provided. 
Requirement three can be satisfied with the following mechanism. So-called blind 
signature schemes (BSS) allow for approving certain content achieved by a third party 
without exposing any information about the content itself (see Chapter 2). The content 
here is represented through the client’s ID and password during the registration and 
voting phase and therefore must not be exposed to the server in order to prevent any 
linking to the client’s ID. 
In the following an example design will be presented showing the functionality of 
the scheme in ℤ161. 
1. Step: Server defines public directory and sends it to the client 
a. Server defines public directory      , with         as public key 
and public modulo             , 
and                              
and                   – 
 
 
     – 
 
 
     
 
  
     
b. Computes secret key              (in mod 132), (Tab.7) 
with (e) relatively prime to φ(n), as                is true. 
c. Sends public directory to client 
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Table 8: Multiplicative inverse of (d) in ℤ132 
φ (n) e B1 B2 q r 
132 35 0 1 3 27 
35 27 1 -3 1 8 
27 8 -3 4 3 3 
8 3 4 -15 2 2 
3 2 -15 34 1 1 
2 1 34 -49 2 0 
 
2. Step: Client computes blinded message and sends it to the server 
a. Client defines message       and random unit       
b. Client Computes blinded message 
                         (in mod 161) 
c. Sends           to the server 
 The server cannot derive any useful information from (BM) 
3. Step: Server signs blinded message and sends it back to the client 
a. Signs the blinded message by computing 
→                                    
→                            
→                                        
→                     (in mod 161) 
b. Sends (BMS = 54) back to client 
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4. Step: Client extracts signed message 
a. Client Computes 
                                    , with 
               (Tab.8) 
b. Obtains the true blind signature to the message             ,  
c. Prove:                            
Table 9: Multiplicative inverse of (r) in ℤ161 
n r B1 B2 q r 
161 3 0 1 53 2 
3 2 1 -53 1 1 
2 1 -53 54 2 0 
 
Requirement four can be satisfied with the following straight-forward security 
proof. It shall be shown that location privacy requirement is satisfied and therefore the 
server has no knowledge about the exact location of the client. 
The following assumptions and definitions are fundamental to show that location 
privacy is present: 
It needs to be assumed that the client only transmits location and auxiliary data to 
the server, such that the auxiliary data as additional location information. It is required 
that the auxiliary data provided by the client shall not reveal any information about the 
client’s ID. The definition IND-LP Raghunathan et al. are giving states that the ability 
to distinguish between two location data sets D0 and D1 must be negligible. For the 
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full system proof, the same indistinguishability needs to apply not only for the 
aggregated location information, but also for the auxiliary information. 
Further Raghunathan et al. define two datasets D0 and D1 as neighbors if there 
exists two tuples in D0(ID,loc) and (ID’, loc’) such that upon swapping only the ID’s 
D0 becomes D1. Further they define view (location information (D), private location 
hotspot protocol (PrivLHS)) as PrivLHS executed over location information D, 
returning the entire transcript of all interactions between the server and the client. As 
D0 and D1∈ D are neighbors, both produce the same aggregated information. In order 
to satisfy the location privacy requirement, all neighboring datasets D0, D1, 
view(D0,PrivLHS) and view(D1,PrivLHS) must be (computationally) 
indistinguishable. 
Informal proof. Raghunathan et al. go on and define intermediate datasets I0 = D0, 
I1,…,In-1, In = D1, with Ij and Ij+1 being neighbors with n denoting the number of clients. 
With the introduction of intermediate datasets and the prior defined neighbor 
definition, a neighbor relation can be identified between e.g. I1 and D0. Given an 
increasing order of ID one can say that after swapping neighboring IDs e.g. the D0 
entry matches D1. From the beginning of the proof, where Ij and Ij+1 being defined as 
neighbors, it follows that transcript of all interactions view (Ij,PrivLHS) ≈ view 
(Ij+1,PrivLHS). Subsequently the standard hybrid argument shows that view 
(D0,PrivLHS) ≈ view (D1,PrivLHS) which completes the proof of location privacy (the 
full proof - Raghunathan et al., 2012). 
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CHAPTER 5 – IMPLEMENTATION 
 
This chapter shall first give an overview on the concept implementation including 
the major software components. Second, it will illustrate the data translation starting 
from the vehicle source passed on to the back-end for further processing. In order 
protect the intellectual property of the Volkswagen Group the following 
implementations shall only be described in its fundamentals. 
 
IMPLEMENTING THE PRESENTED FRAMEWORK 
 
This section will give an overview on the concept implementation including the 
major software components (Fig.14).  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Software overview of the implemented framework 
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In the first step a Volkswagen proprietary software product called Exlap extracts 
the sensor and other data from the in-vehicle communication. Exlap then sends this 
data via HTTP to the back-end server. Exlap is a domain specific protocol to transport 
vehicle specific data (e.g. sensor information, state information) in a non-binary 
format over the "wire" to other devices and domains. The Exlap protocol suite also 
defines the specific bindings for different transport layers, namely Bluetooth, TCP/IP 
(WLAN) and representation via the HTTP protocol. Exlap is primarily aimed to 
provide a generic, uniform and universal access based on the requirements and 
restrictions of today’s and tomorrows (mobile information) devices and their 
underlying platforms, e.g. Java/JavaScript in web browser environments. Exlap relies 
on the use of existing standards (i.e. XML, UTF-8 encoding) to not “reinvent the 
wheel” and encourage the simple processing of the transported data by leveraging the 
native XML processing capabilities of today’s platforms (Fricke et al., 2009). 
The following detail has been left out of the figure (Fig.14) above since it does 
not have any impact on the functionality of the architecture but shall be mentioned for 
the sake of completeness. In this implementation, as a temporary solution, the 
extracted live vehicle data in XML format is first sent to the Volkswagen back-end in 
Germany to be preprocessed before it is sent back to Volkswagen ERL back-end in 
Californian. The communication between Germany and California is based on HTTP. 
For the implementation, the RESTlet architecture shall be used. REST 
(Representational State Transfer) is used for distributed systems such as the World 
Wide Web. It makes use of HTTP client connectors representing a software element 
that enables the communication between components (Fig.15). So called RESTful 
 63 
 
architectures are based on client server relationships, such that a client sends a request 
to a server that will process the request and then send back a response (Fig.15). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The smaller boxes shall represent the connector enabling the communication 
between components which are embodied by the larger boxes. The links denote the 
various communication protocols (HTTP, SMTP, etc.) that can be used. There are two 
very important characteristics. First, a client can have several resources to fulfill 
different tasks (Fig.15). Second, every resource can act as client or server, such that 
the data requested by one server can be made available to others (Fig.15). As the 
architecture name already indicates the communication is based representations of 
resources that are communicated between client and server. The representation of a 
resource is realized in the form of a document describing the current state of a 
resource (Restlet, 2013). 
Once the current XML representation of the collected raw live data from the 
vehicle is received via HTTP POST on the ERL back-end side, it will be parsed into 
the slimmer JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) format. JSON is built on two 
structures, the collection of name/value pairs and an ordered list of values (Json, 
2013). The JSON API represents a hierarchical structure (Fig.16). The two types 
Figure 15: RESTlet client-server architecture (Restlet, 2013) 
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applying for this implementation are JSON Objects and JSON Primitives together 
describing a two dimensional relation. The available data are either represented by an 
immediate JSON primitive (name/value pairs, e.g. engineSpeed/0), or a JSON object 
with the name of a sensor group (e.g. heating) and a value representing several sensors 
in the form of name/value pairs (e.g. seatHeating/value, windowHeating/value, etc.). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
After the explicit vehicle data are extracted they shall be fed into a 
Publish/Subscribe protocol, where data are made available for interested subscribers. 
This implementation uses the Kafka platform as messaging system that was initially 
developed at LinkedIn and is now used by multiple companies for all kinds of data 
pipeline and messaging (Kafka, 2013). In general, publish subscribe mechanisms 
introduce an extended communication infrastructure by i.e. adding topics and 
providing listening applications with subscribing capabilities (MSDN, 2013). 
The task of publishing data in the form of a message that is linked to a topic is 
performed by a so-called producer. Consumers subscribe to a topic and accordingly 
receive every message that is published under it. The distribution of messages happens 
in such a way that each consumer process has its consumer group and each message is 
delivered to precisely one process within a group. This allows for two options. First, 
Figure 16: Hierarchal representation of the JSON API 
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various processes or machines can logically perform as a single consumer (queue 
semantic). On the other hand, in order to have every consumer receive the same 
published message, each of them needs to be in its own group (topic semantic). 
Eventually, Kafka has one more benefit regarding large data that regardless ofthe 
amount of consumers per topic, every message is stored just one time (Kakfa, 2013). 
What this means physically is described by the following. There are three parties, 
the producer and consumer as already mentioned and the distribution server. On the 
server there are two components implemented, the Kafka-Server itself and the 
“Zookeeper.” The Kafka-Server acts as broker (usually another machine) in that those 
messages are physically sent to a server acting as a broker. The broker is caching the 
data that are pushed from the producer and then pulled from the subscriber when ready 
to consume (Fig.17). 
 
 
 
 
Producer and consumer can be started dynamically anytime. The Zookeeper 
coordinates producer and consumer, in terms of meta-data registration (e.g. available 
topics, flow control, etc.) by each broker (Kafka, 2013). 
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SERVER 
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pull 
register 
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register 
Figure 17: Physical communication in Kafka 
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SENDING SAMPLE IS SENT FROM THE VEHICLE TO THE BACKEND 
 
This section will illustrate the data translation starting from the vehicle source 
passed on to the VW ERL back-end for further processing (Fig.18). 
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Figure 18: Data translation overview 
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According to the overview, the major parts of the implementation will now be 
presented and explained. The code is written in the language Java 1.7 using the 
following non-standard public APIs (Tab.9): 
Table 10: API documentation overview 
API-Name Documentation 
Org.json-20090211.jar www.json.org 
Org.restlet.ext.servlet.jar 
www.restlet.org 
Org.restlet.jar 
Scala-library-2.8.0.jar http://www.scala-lang.org/ 
Gson-2.2.2.jar http://code.google.com/p/google-gson/ 
Kafka-0.7.1.jar http://kafka.apache.org/ 
Zkclient-0.1.jar 
http://people.apache.org/~mmorel/apache-
s4-0.5.0-incubating-doc/javadoc/ 
Zookeeper-3.4.0.jar http://zookeeper.apache.org/ 
Log4j-1.2.15.jar http://logging.apache.org/log4j/1.2/ 
Slf4j-1.7.0.jar http://www.slf4j.org/ 
 
At first the recorded vehicle data needs to be translated into Java objects, which is 
mainly achieved by the following lines of code. The notation (…) indicates missing 
code representing internal setups and knowledge and therefore shall remain 
intellectual property of Volkswagen. Further class headers shall not be included in 
order to maintain readability. 
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This first class represents a Restlet client sending the extracted live-data to the 
back-end server. 
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 In the next step the Server Application class accepts the request and routes it to 
corresponding Server Resource class. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Now the vehicle data will be handed over to the Kafka Server class that functions 
as interface between the HTTP-Post resource and the Kafka server running the Kafka 
producer class 
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The following producer class is responsible for the explicit vehicle data extraction 
that is available for each available sensor group. The data extraction is indicated as 
“Parser” and shall remain intellectual property of Volkswagen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
 
As a final step a consumer thread will be started below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The consumer class is now sending out the data request related to a consumer 
group and including a topic representing the required sensor signal. 
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CHAPTER 6 – EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
 
This describes the test setup for the framework implementation, as well as the 
already mentioned Golden Rules in order to evaluate the privacy concept in the 
subsequent chapter. 
IMPLEMENTATION TEST CASES 
 
Test cases for the framework have been defined based on standard black-box and 
white-box tests, looking at inputs and outputs, and whether the internal data 
processing operates as required. The system has been tested with two types of sensor 
data, a common gas vehicle and an electric vehicle (EV). The test data provided in this 
section is based on the EV data. The source data available comprises roughly 140 
sensor data groups with sub-sensors ranging from 2-130. For the following test 
scenario the available sub-sensors range from 0-3, which also considers empty groups. 
The conceptual overview of the system below illustrates the inputs and outputs as well 
the data translation inside the system (Fig.19). 
 
 
 
 
 
SYSTEM 
PROCESSING 
OF 
TIME-BASED 
UPDATE 
PACKAGES 
INPUT 
 
AVAILABLE 
SENSOR 
DATA 
 
OUTPUT 
 EXPLICIT 
SENSOR 
GROUPS 
 
Figure 19: Conceptual system overview 
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In the following test cases are defined based on standard black-box and white-box 
criteria. These cases shall be used in the evaluation to test the final implementation of 
the presented framework. 
This first table defines the specific test cases including name, testing method, and 
brief description (Tab.10). 
 
Table 11: Defined Test Cases 
Name Method Description 
Data set Creating outputs allowing to compare 
the original XML file (extracted 
vehicle data) with newly created 
JSON file by comparing elements 
randomly 
Checks for the correct format of 
the testing data defining the 
vehicles update set. 
Successful, if JSON elements 
match XML elements. 
Update Creating an output that indicates a 
successfully received update set 
including a comparison of data that 
was sent with the data that has been 
received 
Verifies that the update has been 
received correctly. 
Successful, if sent elements match 
received elements and prompt 
indicates update received. 
Producer Creating an output of the extracted 
elements that shall be made available 
and compare them with the original 
elements from the source file 
Verifies that the producer has 
extracted the vehicle data 
correctly from the update set. 
Successful, if extracted elements 
match original elements. 
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Consumer Creating an output that shows the 
subscription which can be validated in 
two steps. First, the requested data 
need to match the topic that has been 
subscribed to. Second, compare the 
received data with the original file in 
order to approve the data correctness. 
Verifies that the subscriber has 
received the vehicle correctly 
from the publisher/producer. 
Successful, if subscribed topic 
matches the prompt indicating the 
received data. And the received 
value of the data element matches 
the value from the original file. 
 
This second defines the specific inputs and expected outputs corresponding to the 
test cases (Tab.11). 
Table 12: Defined Inputs and Outputs 
Name Input Expected Output 
Data set XML file JSON file 
Update JSON file JSON file, reception approval 
Producer JSON file Extracted vehicle data 
Subscriber Consumer ID, group ID, 
subscribed topic 
Vehicle data corresponding to topic, 
with time stamp of creation 
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GOLDEN RULES 
 
As part of the Federal Data Protection Act the so called “Golden rules” are 
mounted into the German, British and most other European countries federal laws. 
The act focuses on the protection against misuse of personal data in terms of data 
processing. The definition can e.g. be found as annex to section 9 in the German 
“Federal Data Protection Act”, which is related to technical and organizational 
measures and therefore fundamental policy for big companies, like Volkswagen 
dealing with various amounts of data. 
 
The following stated 10 paragraphs are extracted from the German “Federal Data 
Protection Act”, German orig.: “Bundesdatenschutzgesetz”. 
 “Where personal data are processed automatically, measures suited to the type of 
personal data to be protected shall be taken 
 
1. to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to data processing 
systems with which personal data are processed (access control),  
2. to prevent storage media from being read, copied, modified or removed 
without, authorization (storage media control),  
3. to prevent unauthorized input into the memory and the unauthorized 
examination, modification or erasure of stored personal data (memory 
control),  
4. to prevent data processing systems from being used by unauthorized 
persons with the aid of data transmission facilities (user control),  
5. to ensure that persons entitled to use a data processing system have access 
only to the data to which they have a right of access (access control),  
6. to ensure that it is possible to check and establish to which bodies personal 
data can be communicated by means of data transmission facilities 
(communication control)  
7. to ensure that it is possible to check and establish which personal data 
have been input into data processing systems by whom and at what time 
(input control),  
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8. to ensure that, in the case of commissioned processing of personal data, 
the data are processed strictly in accordance with the instructions of the 
principal (job control) ,  
9. to prevent data from being read, copied, modified or erased without 
authorization during the transmission of personal data or the transport of 
storage media (transfer control),  
10. to arrange the internal organization of authorities or enterprises in such a 
way that it meets the specific requirements of data protection 
(organizational control).” (BDSG, 1990) 
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CHAPTER 7 – EVALUATION 
 
In this chapter it will be evaluated whether the applied privacy mechanisms for 
the various concepts are satisfying the data protection requirements stated by the 
Golden Rules (Chapter 2 and 6). Further a brief summary of the back-box and white-
box tests regarding the framework implementation shall be given. Eventually, it shall 
be assessed, whether there is a trade-off between the usability of concept functionality 
and the level of privacy protection.  
 
TESTING THE COMMUNICATION 
 
This section is based on the in Chapter 6 defined test cases regarding the main 
concept (Tab.12). In the following the results of the implementation testing shall be 
presented.  
Table 13: Test cases including success criteria 
Name Success criteria 
Data set JSON elements match XML elements. 
Update If sent elements match received elements and prompt 
indicates update received. 
Producer The extracted elements match original elements. 
Consumer The subscribed topic matches the prompt indicating the 
received data. And the received value of the data element 
matches the value from the original file. 
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For the following test scenario the available sub-sensors range from 0-3, which 
also considers empty groups. In order to differentiate easier between the different 
formats, a brief syntax overview shall be provided. 
In general The XML file can be identified by the <text>content</text> syntax, 
whereas the JSON file can be identified by the “name”: {“name”: “value”} syntax. 
Case 1: Data set 
The following prompts show parts of the JSON file generated from the original 
XML vehicle data below (Fig.20 & Fig.21). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the different formats, both show the same data and values, which 
indicates that the format conversion was done correctly.  
Figure 20: JSON representation of the vehicle data 
Figure 21: XML source of the vehicle data 
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Case 2: Update 
The following two prompts show parts of the received update (Fig.22 & Fig.23). 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The received data are identical to the data that were sent indicating a correct 
transfer via HTTP-Post. 
Figure 22: First part of the update 
Figure 23: Second part of the update 
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Case 3: Producer 
The following prompts indicate the extracted data from the parser included in the 
NewProducer class. The top of the first prompt shows the timestamp. The bottom part 
of the first prompt (Fig.24) and the second prompt (Fig.25) show the received HTTP-
Post data processed by the producer with the implemented JSON parser. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the two prompts (Fig.24 & Fig.25) show the same information as the original 
vehicle data XML (XF), it indicates that the processing was done correctly. 
Figure 24: Timestamp and extracted vehicle data 
Figure 25: Extracted vehicle data 
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Case 4: Consumer 
The following prompts show two different subscriptions of the same implemented 
consumer (Fig.26 & Fig.27) including the subscription and the corresponding received 
data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As both prompts (Fig.26 & Fig.27) show that the consumed data corresponds to 
the subscribed signal group, it indicates the subscription process was done 
successfully. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: First subscription 
Figure 27: Second subscription 
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DISCUSSING THE RESPONSIBILTY OF PRIVACY PROTECTION 
 
As it was cited earlier in this thesis, the “Golden Rules” as part of the German 
“Federal Data Protection Act” are focusing on the protection against misuse of 
personal data in data processing. It is related to technical and organizational measures 
and therefore fundamental policy for big OEMs (car manufacturers) like Volkswagen 
dealing with various amounts of data. 
The following tables and graphics will illustrate how the responsibility for 
privacy protection or often referred to as data protection is divided throughout the 
lifecycle of a product in an automotive environment. It shall become apparent that not 
all responsibility relies on the concept but a significant amount of protection 
mechanisms are dictated by law and therefore already implemented by other parties of 
the protection process. While indicating what privacy mechanisms are already taken 
care of by other parties like e.g. the OEM and the developer pending protection needs 
covered by the concept shall be pointed out as well (Tab.13). 
 
Table 14: Policies and Responsibilities 
Policy section Responsibility 
1. Access control (unauthorized persons) OEM, developer 
2. Storage media control Privacy concept 
3. Media control Privacy concept 
4. User control OEM, developer 
5. Access control (access rights) OEM 
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6. Communication control Privacy concept 
7. Input control Privacy concept 
8. Job control OEM, developer 
9. Transfer control Privacy concept 
10. Organizational control OEM 
There are three major parties, the OEM (car manufacturer), the developer, and the 
developed concept or later product. The process of data protection can be described as 
a layered model (Fig.28). 
 
 
 
 
 
The outside layer is represented by the OEM covering tasks like access control, 
communication controls and offering user and job controls. The developer in turn must 
make use of these provided controls to keep data protected. In the last step, for the 
concept and later product the developer must incorporate mainly input, transfer and 
communication protection mechanisms but also make use of secure storage and 
memory to protect information. The OEM in other words provides the secure 
environment with right policies, security zones, secure login, and hardware and 
software encryption for mobile devices (Tab.14, Tab.15). The developer has to make 
sure that throughout the development phase and later on in the lifecycle the concept 
implementation allows for data protection. General mechanisms are i.e. choosing 
Figure 28: Data protection responsibility breakdown 
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passwords with high security level, using encrypted mobile devices that are accessible 
to authorized persons only (Tab.14, Tab.15). Further the developer is responsible for 
the integration of protection mechanisms into the concept and later product. 
In the next section it shall be discussed whether the defined privacy requirements 
agree with the consent of the Golden Rules policies. 
 
PRIVACY PROTECTION MECHANISMS APPLIED TO THE MAIN AND THE 
RELATED CONCEPTS 
 
Fulfill the privacy protection mechanisms the required policies? 
The concept and later product in this context shall be defined as an information 
exchange system mostly based on software that interacts over mobile Internet 
connections like e.g. UMTS communicating over powerful antennas covering most of 
the automotive infrastructure. Therefore i.e. the communication and input controls 
must be covered by the concept in terms of privacy profiles and auditing mechanisms 
for transparency purposes (Tab.14). One can define the privacy concept again as a 
multi-layered concept. The first layer is addressed by the profile preferences that are 
making sure that only authorized requests are processed and only permitted data leave 
the vehicle. The decision power clearly remains with the source. The next layer is 
responsible for the transfer of personal data from the source to the service providing 
OEM. Private data must be protected through ciphering and key management, making 
sure that the access is limited again to authorized persons only (Tab.14). The secret 
key agreement between client and OEM limits the data access additionally. Digital 
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signatures eventually make sure that only authenticated is considered in order to 
increase the trust between the parties. 
Table 15: Policies and mechanisms regarding the new framework 
Policy description (*) Mechanisms applied to this policy 
1. “to prevent unauthorized persons from 
gaining access to data processing systems 
with which personal data are processed 
(access control)”  
 
Policies, security zones, public-key 
infrastructure (PKI) access control, 
network access control, operating 
system access control, secure logon 
procedure, password security, session 
time out detection, define user 
responsibilities, offer hardware or 
software encryption mobile devices (**) 
2. “to prevent storage media from being 
read, copied, modified or removed without 
authorization (storage media control)” 
Data Encryption Standard, RSA Digital 
Signature 
3. “to prevent unauthorized input into the 
memory and the unauthorized examination, 
modification or erasure of stored personal 
data (memory control)” 
Data Encryption Standard, RSA Digital 
Signature 
4. “to prevent data processing systems 
from being used by unauthorized persons 
with the aid of data transmission facilities 
(user control)” 
Password security, user responsibilities, 
use hardware or software encrypted 
mobile devices (**) 
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5. “to ensure that persons entitled to use a 
data processing system have access only to 
the data to which they have a right of 
access (access control)” 
Public-key infrastructure (PKI) access 
control, secret key management, access 
right profiles, access on a “need to 
know” basis (**) 
6. “to ensure that it is possible to check 
and establish to which bodies personal data 
can be communicated by means of data 
transmission facilities (communication 
control)” 
Privacy profile permissions, auditing 
(**) 
7. “to ensure that it is possible to check 
and establish which personal data have 
been input into data processing systems by 
whom and at what time (input control)” 
Privacy profile permissions, auditing 
(**) 
8. “to ensure that, in the case of 
commissioned processing of personal data, 
the data are processed strictly in 
accordance with the instructions of the 
principal (job control)” 
Authentication, authorization, auditing, 
job responsibilities (must handle 
information with care, must apply valid 
IT security regulations), “doing the right 
thing” (**) 
9. “to prevent data from being read, 
copied, modified or erased without 
authorization during the transmission of 
personal data or the transport of storage 
media (transfer control)” 
Privacy profile permissions, Data 
Encryption Standard, RSA Digital 
Signature 
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10. “to arrange the internal organization of 
authorities or enterprises in such a way that 
it meets the specific requirements of data 
protection (organizational control)” 
Responsibilities are defined within the 
company, protective measures 
instructed to employees, the information 
and data security has an advising role  
and needs to give approval in case of 
possible exceptions (**)(***) 
 (*) (BDGS, 1994), (**)(Fröhlich, 2003-2010), (***)(Knerlein, 2002)  
 
PRIVATE HOTSPOT IDENTIFICATION AS A DIFFERENT DATA 
DISTRIBUTION CONCEPT 
 
Fulfill the privacy protection mechanisms the defined policies? 
As in the section before, the “Golden Rules” shall be utilized as a standardized 
compilation of privacy requirements (Tab.15). As the hotspot identification protocol 
describes a private interaction between client and OEM, such that no personal data are 
revealed or stored, the emerging anonymous results therefore only need to be 
authenticated. In order to prevent tampering with voting results, additional hotspot 
information as defined by Raghunathan et al. as auxiliary data, shall be protected as 
well. Accordingly the standard OEM data protection controls remain necessary 
(Tab.15). 
The private hotspot identification protocol describes an alternative data exchange 
concept based upon a significantly reduced amount of exchanged information. One 
can describe this concept as privacy protection in different stages. Again, it is mostly 
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based on software that interacts over mobile Internet connections. Adjusted to the 
different concept, the communication and input controls are covered by respectively 
different data protection mechanisms. Besides the necessary auditing instrument for 
transparency purposes, the concept comprises four main mechanisms. 
In order to maintain location privacy, all personal information i.e. identification 
(ID), password, and actual location are hidden or remain undistinguishable. This is 
achieved through a commitment scheme that binds to an ID-password pair during the 
registration phase, while hiding it during the voting phase in order to keep privacy 
protected (see Chapter 2). It is in the responsibility of the individual to not reveal or to 
even sell this pair to a third party. In case the individual decides to do so anyway, the 
assumption is that the amount of tampered votes represents an obvious minority that 
does not allow manipulating the overall voting result. During the voting phase the 
protocol uses Blind Signatures in order to prevent a linking possibility between the 
client’s signature and account information. This mechanism shall inhibit the 
identification of a client by his digital signature and thereby enhance anonymity. The 
third form of anonymity enhancement is achieved through a so called Zero Knowledge 
Proof of Knowledge (ZKPoK) that is used also during the voting phase. It enables the 
OEM to validate the clients’ votes with zero knowledge about the individual client’s 
account information. In other words the incentive is that the OEM is able to 
authenticate a client without knowing the actual identity. Additionally, based on the 
informal proof given in Chapter 4, stating that due to the neighboring relation between 
clients and the rounded location hotspot identification, the OEM cannot determine the 
actual location of the client. 
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Eventually, the decision power remains with the source once again. The client can 
decide if and what to vote for while not revealing any personal information. Although 
private data are not revealed, several mechanisms work on different stages all relying 
on each other, it is still good practice to have multilayer security. In order to provide 
multilayer security the protocol incorporates standard key management between client 
and OEM limiting the access to protocol data. Digital signatures ultimately make sure 
that only authenticated data are considered in order to increase the trust between the 
parties. 
Table 16: Policies and mechanisms regarding the hotspot protocol 
Policy description (*) Mechanisms applied to this policy 
1. “to prevent unauthorized persons from 
gaining access to data processing systems 
with which personal data are processed 
(access control)”  
 
Policies, security zones, public-key 
infrastructure (PKI) access control, 
network access control, operating 
system access control, secure logon 
procedure, password security, session 
time out detection, define user 
responsibilities, offer hardware or 
software encryption mobile devices (**) 
2. “to prevent storage media from being 
read, copied, modified or removed without 
authorization (storage media control)”  
 
Commitment Scheme, Blind Signature 
for registration data. Standard hardware 
or software encryption is sufficient to 
protect voting results 
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3. “to prevent unauthorized input into the 
memory and the unauthorized examination, 
modification or erasure of stored personal 
data (memory control)” 
Commitment Scheme, Blind Signature 
Scheme during registration otherwise no 
personal information is revealed 
4. “to prevent data processing systems 
from being used by unauthorized persons 
with the aid of data transmission facilities 
(user control)” 
Password security, user responsibilities, 
use hardware or software encrypted 
mobile devices (**) 
 
5. “to ensure that persons entitled to use a 
data processing system have access only to 
the data to which they have a right of 
access (access control)” 
Public-key infrastructure (PKI) access 
control, secret key management, access 
right profiles, access on a “need to 
know” basis (**) 
6. “to ensure that it is possible to check 
and establish to which bodies personal data 
can be communicated by means of data 
transmission facilities (communication 
control)”  
Commitment Scheme (during 
registration), auditing 
7. “to ensure that it is possible to check 
and establish which personal data have 
been input into data processing systems by 
whom and at what time (input control)”  
Only personal is registration data. 
During the actual voting no personal 
data are revealed at any time 
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8. “to ensure that, in the case of 
commissioned processing of personal data, 
the data are processed strictly in 
accordance with the instructions of the 
principal (job control)”  
Authentication, authorization, auditing, 
job responsibilities (must handle 
information with care, must apply valid 
IT security regulations), “doing the right 
thing” (**) 
9. “to prevent data from being read, 
copied, modified or erased without 
authorization during the transmission of 
personal data or the transport of storage 
media (transfer control)”  
Commitment Scheme, Blind Signature 
Scheme, Zero Knowledge Proof of 
Knowledge - ZKPoK 
10. “to arrange the internal organization of 
authorities or enterprises in such a way that 
it meets the specific requirements of data 
protection (organizational control)”  
Responsibilities are defined within the 
company, protective measures 
instructed to employees, the information 
and data security has an advising role 
and needs to give approval in case of 
possible exceptions (**)(***) 
(*) (BDGS, 1994), (**)(Fröhlich, 2003-2010), (***)(Knerlein, 2002) 
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DERIVED DATA PRIVACY CLASSES 
 
The data applications investigated in Chapter 2 have been evaluated according to 
the data that are exchanged. During this privacy-based evaluation, three data 
categories have been observed: 1) identifiable, 2) time/location based, and 3) 
broadcast or independent. Table 5 in Chapter 2 presents the details of observed data 
categories in various application types. The security classes listed below apply the 
following four mechanisms, derived from the Golden Rules (Chapter 6). 
1. Access control mechanisms and rights 
2. Secured storage 
3. Secured communication 
4. Degree of relation to a specific individual 
Table 17: Privacy level based on defined data categories 
Privacy 
Classes 
Identifiable data 
Time/location based 
data 
Broadcasted data, 
independent data 
Personal 
Data 
Name, bank information, 
social security, insurance 
information, address, 
telephone number, vehicle 
identification number, 
account information, 
license plate sensor data, 
social data, profile data 
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Personal 
Related 
Data 
 Timed position, 
driving data, 
traveled 
destinations, 
Recommendations 
(routes, charging), 
Profile data 
 
Derivative 
Data 
 Preferences (routes, 
driving style, 
charging history, 
news, sport and 
music), social data 
Unrelated 
Data 
 Unrelated sensor 
data, car make, 
model 
 
The derived data privacy classes define the foundation for the profile 
management (Tab.16). In general, the classification presented here can be used as 
guidelines when designing privacy protection mechanisms for the existing and the 
applications to be. 
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CHAPTER 8 – RELATED WORK 
 
This chapter will give an overview of the previous attempts to improve privacy 
protection, as well as introduce currently discussed legal issues. 
 
PRIVACY PROTECTION THROUGH ANONYMITY 
 
Wiedersheim et al. have demonstrated the possibility of reconstructing long traces 
of a majority of vehicles within the same area. According to their work it is more than 
questionable if location privacy is achievable in IVC systems against a powerful 
adversary. Even though actual identities are replaced by pseudonyms and those also 
change over time, once a target is identified based on its location every vehicle can be 
tracked. Multi-hypothesis tracking (MHT) is largely recognized as the ideal 
methodology to solve data association problems in present multiple target tracking 
(MTT) systems (Blackman, 2004). 
The general approach is based on multiple moving targets in a defined area while 
their position is being sampled at random or periodic intervals. With measurements 
comes noise and errors. For that reason most MHT systems are combined with filter 
operations like the Kalman filter. The Kalman filter makes its decision based on the 
current state, a prediction and a current measurement. The prediction results from 
known movements of targeted object. The measurement is the outcome of measured 
beacons (identification messages). The iterative process of prediction is used to 
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estimate the next position of a vehicle within context of multi hypothesis tracking 
(Fig.29). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general for each measurement (marked as dots, see Fig.30) one hypothesis 
shall be created. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictions are rated with higher probabilities, when they are close to 
measurements. A hypothesis is defined as one potential track based on a set of 
measurements. The most likely track is generated from multiple hypotheses. 
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Figure 29: Kalman iterations 
Figure 30: Kalman based muli hypothesis tracking (Wiedersheim et al., 2010) 
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Eventually the authors show in their evaluation how identities become negligible 
with traceability. The approach follows the idea of reducing the communication 
density in terms of adjusting the beaconing (identification messages) intervals 
(Fig.31). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the graph indicates with a density of 100 vehicles and a beacon interval of 1s 
or shorter, every vehicle can be tracked for about                    . It seems 
obvious that decreasing the beaconing rate can be tool to reduce the traceability. 
Unfortunately        is commonly discussed in standardization activities to 
guarantee reliable communication (Schoch et al., 2006). In a second step the authors 
look into adjusting the pseudonym changing intervals, with the result of necessary 
pseudonym changing intervals significantly than shorter 30sec. These rates are 
considered high rates and cause a substantial decrease in performance (Schoch et al., 
2006). In other words, both adjustments to enhance privacy are not practical. 
 
  
     
    
    
    
    
  
                   
      
    
    
      
    
     
    
Me
an 
tra
cki
ng 
dur
ati
on 
    
Number of vehicles 
Figure 31: Variation of beaconing intervals (Wiedersheim et al., 2010) 
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PRIVACY PROFILE MANAGEMENT 
 
Some years ago IBM developed a concept called MyPrivacy Component 
Architecture (Fig.32). It represents a complete concept presenting a flexible and 
transparent privacy protection profile that was considered for Internet use only (Bohrer 
et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The several components of this architecture shall protect private data. The main 
functionalities provided by this architecture are profile and policy/rule management 
accompanied by the authorization engine, as well as the profile responder and profile 
updater. The primary task of both management components is profile and policy 
maintenance of the system. The engine shall handle data requests based on the defined 
policies. The profile responder adds personal privacy statement according to the 
profile. The profile updater allows for modification within the profile. In case of more 
complex requests a smaller portion of the requests can be handled manually by the 
manual components. For more protection the interaction history agent intervenes in 
case certain actions must be intercepted. 
Figure 32: IBM MyPrivacy Component Architecture (Bohrer et al., 2001) 
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The general idea shall not only be to protect private data but also provide more 
transparency and scalability when it comes to exposing private data. Instead of 
agreeing to general business terms specific requests shall be visible in order to 
understand the purpose and action of the provided services. Since a lot of services out 
on the market come with reasonable data requests and very useful everyday amenities 
it should be up to the client to differentiate. The decision shall be service-wise by 
setting different privacy rules based on the various services (e.g. dealer profiles, 
workshop profile, tolling system profile). 
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LATEST PRIVACY DISCUSSIONS 
 
This section will give an abstract on the privacy concerns that are currently 
discussed in public and in general between the US and EU governments. 
 
The right to be forgotten 
The current EU privacy debate seeks to enhance the privacy of its citizen. The 
declared goal is to strengthen the data protection laws for the web, which is getting 
slammed by large Internet firms and lobbyists. What happened was that the European 
Commissioner for Justice Viviane Reding presented a draft (Reding draft) regarding a 
revised data protection regulation early 2012 as an adjustment to the Internet age. The 
right for privacy often referred to as “the right to be forgotten” shall arise again to 
protect the consumers’ personal data. The main parties involved in this debate are 
companies, civil rights proponents and data protection officials in the EU member 
states. The biggest challenge in data protection is the outcome of the connected world 
enabling various data combinations. The mainly agreed upon approach is that personal 
data can be obtained by firms and applications, if they have obtained the consent of 
the user. The Reding draft specifically states, “the legitimate interests pursued by” the 
entity that processes the data may make consent unnecessary, as long as such interests 
are not “overridden by the interests or fundamental right and freedoms of the data 
subject”. In other words, in case the individual representing the “data subject” must be 
given the opportunity to deny the processing of the data. 
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Current privacy cases regarding traveling safety 
In the last days of 2012 the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
proposed regulations asking car manufacturers to build event data recorders also 
known as "black boxes" into all new cars and light trucks (Lowy, J., 2012). The 
proposal seems far behind since automakers have already been quietly integrating the 
devices, which are automatically recording the actions of drivers and the responses of 
their vehicles in a continuous information loop, into most new cars for years. One of 
the purposes is in case a vehicle is involved in a crash or when its airbags deploy, 
inputs from the vehicle's sensors within the 5 to 10 seconds before impact are 
automatically preserved. Within current discussions privacy advocates claim that 
government regulators and automakers are distributing an intrusive technology 
without having any policy in place that prevents abuse of the collected data. Some 
manufacturers already are collecting such data. According to the associate director of 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center there are no rules or limits, no 
consequences and there is no transparency. One major concern is that the growing 
computerization of vehicles and transmission of data to and from vehicles might lead 
to illegal uses of recorder data. 
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Current privacy cases regarding social media and connected applications 
Social media platforms as they are already implemented into the latest in-vehicle 
media systems have grown into a major business for all kinds of data trading. 
Platforms like Facebook are known to make their money by selling their website space 
and other available data to different companies. Therefore it is not surprising that 
Facebook is constantly fighting against claims that could compromise this business. 
One of the current claims is comes from one of the German privacy regulators 
referring to the fact that Facebook denies the use of pseudonyms. Facebook is 
officially claiming that the main purpose of the requirement is to keep the website 
secure (Spiegel-WireReports, 2013). 
In the past year it has been detected that Apple and other companies have been 
transferring their users’ calendars from their phones to company servers. The outcome 
of this controversy had the upside that Apple was forced to change its practices and 
required apps in its store to ask for permission first, before tapping into address books. 
California Attorney General Kamala Harris achieved an agreement with Amazon, 
Apple, Google, Microsoft and others aligning the mobile app industry with existing 
California law. One of the major requirements asks online services that collect 
personal data to visibly post a privacy rule. On the downside again, by the end of last 
year the Senate approved an act that reauthorizes the country’s warrantless 
wiretapping program through 2017. It allows the government to electronically spy on 
citizens’ communications with nearly no control until one of the involved parties is 
believed to be outside the United States. Proposed amendments are demanding for 
more transparency (San Francisco Chronicle, 2012).  
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 CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSION 
 
As Bohrer et al. put it appropriately, the question is not anymore “to give or not to 
give” personal data, since in the modern world there is no way to live outside the 
digital or connected world. Everybody has private data stored somewhere at some 
company or institution. Accordingly, the new question must be “how to deal with the 
given data and how to control the personal data in the future”, as it now has become a 
problem of business and society. 
Most Internet and smart phone users are already experiencing privacy no longer 
just as a footnote. It is written in big letters, in order to be transparent and thereby gain 
the trust of the user, who is perhaps using a smart phone app or an online service. The 
implementation described in this thesis has shown that the connected world we know 
from the Internet and smart phones has already reached the automobile. People enjoy 
the benefits of the Internet, like shopping without necessarily leaving the house. 
Hence, it is perhaps obvious that people would enjoy similar benefits in their vehicle. 
A vehicle offering general location information, like points of interests (POIs) with 
just one scroll move, have already been established in the connected automotive 
world. Extending this approach by offering personalized route or other 
recommendations or online diagnosis for your vehicle without the need of seeing a 
mechanic upfront will bring the same benefits into the automotive world. 
The other perspective on this topic is the view of the OEM. In times, where data 
are flowing constantly, customers become anxious about what is going to happen with 
their personal data. The origin of this concern comes in most cases of human history 
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from a lack of the understanding due to the data complexity. Successful companies 
these days have discovered exactly this, that in order to gain the customer’s trust, 
comprehensible privacy terms are extremely important. The IBM-MyPrivacy 
Component Architecture was implemented for the traditional Internet usage. Instead of 
just accepting the terms of conditions of a service, this approach makes sure that the 
requested information agrees with the terms defined by the user itself. In other words, 
the service cannot request more data than the user allows, as the negotiation example 
in Chapter 4 has demonstrated. This thesis has shown how this profile management 
concept can also be applied to the connected automotive world and what indication it 
has for privacy protection. Possible future work could discuss whether the user 
identification should be managed individually by the service providers or by a central 
instance, similar to latest Google+ approach. 
The discussion on privacy responsibilities has revealed how factors like secured 
communication, secured storage, access control and related rights are divided among 
the developing entities involved. The data analysis over the most common automotive 
and related connected applications has been summarized in new data categories 
representing the new data complexity. Building on these categories, a new generation 
of automotive data security classes has been defined, which shall serve as a basis for 
the adopted privacy profile management. One of features of the privacy management 
system is flexibility, which has been proven to be important, by demonstrating how 
data complexity and thereby privacy requirements vary with the service. 
Overall, it became apparent that the answer to the question of how to control the 
data is transparency. As people enjoy the benefits of communicating vehicles 
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(UIEvolution, 2012), it is important to distinguish between the various data provided 
by the user and define a profile management that acts accordingly. 
In contrast, Raghunathan et al. have introduced an approach attacking the 
challenge of keeping location privacy protected, while practicing location-data mining 
operations. The proposed system identifies location hotspots (like events or other 
sights), without learning who is present in particular. As a second feature, the paper 
introduces a recommendation service building on the hotspot detection. 
This approach is clearly a step forward in terms of only sharing what is important, 
while hiding what has no immediate impact on the subject (e.g. personal data). On the 
other hand, the reason why this is feasible is that the overall message resulting from 
the protocol is a “quantity statement”. Consequently, this makes the inclusion of e.g. 
personal data, negligible. In the automotive context, quantity statements can be used in 
several contexts like sight-seeing, limited diagnosis aspects, aftermarket support, or 
marketing. Overall, this protocol is applicable to every service, where the only key 
aspect is the location itself and no personalized service is required. 
Eventually, current reports have shown how several manufacturers have already 
been collecting data without the knowledge and/or consent of the customer. Major 
privacy concerns result from the growing computerization of vehicles and 
transmission of data to and from vehicles. The fact that no rules, limits nor 
consequences have yet been determined demands immediate action improving the 
overall transparency, as presented in this thesis. 
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